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Efforts to maximize the impact of network centric warfare (NCW) rely 
upon the effective integration of human and technological agents. Combat 
and command and control models must represent the entirety of a 
network-centric organization, including both humans and non-human 
components which comprise any complex system.  The Dynamic Model 
of Situated Cognition (DMSC) was introduced by Miller and Shattuck in 
2003 as a tool to help analyze this kind of complex system.  The model 
has been applied in a variety of contexts to analyze military command and 
control and extended and applied to areas broader than its original use.  
This paper proposes to extend the model by explicitly adding Red force 
cognitive processes.  With the addition of adversary forces, aspects of 
information warfare can be modeled.   This includes actions against an 
enemy’s sensors and communications networks intended to reduce the 
quality of his information position and to disrupt the interaction between 
human and non-human elements of his command structure.  Potential 
applications for the extension are proposed, including planning for and 
analyzing the effectiveness of 21st Century effects-based information 








In 2003, the dynamic model for situated cognition was introduced in response to 
weaknesses in previous models to represent the entirety of a network centric 
organization.  By explicitly including the human elements of a command and control 
(C2) system, it provided analysts with a means to address their capabilities and 
limitations as required by a complete doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, 
personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) perspective.  This kind of complete understanding 
of any system or required capability is required by the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System [CJCSI 3170.01E].  The model assumes a dynamic process and 
examines the interaction between humans and their non-human counterparts in the C2 
process.  Even though the model started as a simplistic representation of a single 
decision-maker, it has been extended and modified to include more complex team 
interactions and how sensor and network resources are managed.   
 
Its primary remaining limitation at this point is that only friendly forces (or Blue forces) 
are modeled.  A complete model for battlespace cognition should include the cognitive 
processes of enemy forces (Red forces) as well.  Their cognitive processes and how those 
processes result in actions in the battlespace must be examined.  The interaction between 
Red forces and Blue forces in the info-structure domain may have as profound an impact 
on a conflict’s outcome as any interaction in the physical domain. 
 
 
Review of model with extensions 
 
The original model was an attempt to define a common framework with which groups of 
operations research analysts and human factors engineers could communicate effectively.  
It illustrates the role played by humans and their non-human entities within the command 
and control system, demonstrating that consideration of both is necessary to analyze true 
shared battlespace awareness. 
 
As first conceived, the model consisted of six ovals and three lenses.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 1: Original DMSC, where there is a distinction between the roles of hardware and 
software system elements and the roles of people-ware elements.  The three ovals on the 
left side (Ovals 1, 2 and 3) represent the technological side of the system.  The three 
ovals on the right side represent the human cognitive processes [Miller & Shattuck, 
2004].  Oval 1 represents ground truth of the total battlespace.  This includes location and 
status of friendly, enemy and neutral forces; as well as terrain, weather and other 
environmental conditions.  Oval 2 and Oval 3 are always subsets of the true picture, 
representing sensed objects and which of those are available to users.  The quantity and 
quality of the information is a function of sensor parameters (performance, settings, field 
of view, etc) and C2 system parameters (availability, capacity, etc).  Not only is there a 
selective filtering of which parts of Oval 1 are propagated, but there is also the potential 
to include errors due to mistakes in sensor fusion algorithms. 
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Figure 1: Original DMSC 
 
Perceptual and Technological 
Cognitive Systems Systems 
 
 
Ovals 4, 5 and 6 on the right side of the model represent the perception of data elements, 
the comprehension of the current situation (sometimes called a mental model) and the 
individual’s projection of current events into the future.  Three lenses (A, B, and C) that 
transform the information between these last ovals consisted of the local situation, the 
military operational order (OPORD), military doctrine, the experience of the operator, 
and an individual’s temporary state such as fatigue. 
 
As with any human-based enterprise, mistakes of perception and comprehension are 
made.  The model treats those as distortions in the lenses result in inaccuracies in 
perceptions (Oval 4), comprehensions, (Oval 5), or projections (Oval 6).  Such errors in 
information transformation are illustrated in Figure 2: Lens distortions.  It was recognized 
that once inaccurate data were accepted into any stage of the model, this inaccuracy 
would be propagated throughout the remaining ovals, leading to inaccurate conclusions 
and potentially poor decisions on the part of a force commander. 
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 Figure 2: Lens distortions 
 
The model can include feedback loops to represent the result of a commander’s decision-
making process.  These decisions include direction to physical forces and management of 
sensor and network resources as shown in Figure 3: Oval feedback.  Other feedback 
includes adjustments OPORD and local doctrine.  This can be visualized in a similar 
fashion, but the arrows now point at the lenses before the ovals of perception, 
comprehension and projection.  It is an attempt by the decision maker to reduce the 






























Figure 3: Oval feedback  
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Other extensions include team interaction in which Ovals 1 and 2 were the same for 
several different teams (shared), but Ovals 3 through 6 differ among individual members 
of the same team.  The point of divergence in such a teaming environment may be Oval 2 
(if sensor output is not shared) or at Oval 4 (if all participants have equal access to the 
shared C2 network).  Direct interaction with other humans was also included by adding 
stick-figures just after Oval 3 and before the first lens.  This injects the verbal reports 
from those humans into the perceptions of the decision maker along with other data 
available from Oval 3 [Miller & Shattuck, 2006]. 
 
A more thorough treatment of the original model, recent extensions, and current 






We normally designate those forces that stand in opposition to our goals in the 
battlespace as “Red forces” and our own (along with our allies) as “Blue forces.”  It 
would be naïve to assume our potential enemies have not considered their own C2 
systems with the same rigor as we have examined our own.  Now, we include Red force 
cognition in the model.  Here, the interest is not only in the Blue force commander’s 
perception and comprehension, but those of the Red forces as shown in Figure 4.  All the 
previously discussed transformations of the ovals of perceptions in the model are 
applicable to the Red force.  The Red sensors sense only a portion of the total battlespace.  
Only a portion of that is available on the local C2 system.  In turn, it is perceived by the 
decision maker where the lenses of his doctrine and experience transform it into his 
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It is important to note that Oval 1, Ground Truth, is the actual battlespace and forms the 
one common element in the center of this extended model.  This is the true physical 
domain of conflict in which traditional forces engage each other. 
 
Of course, this introduces a level of complexity not originally conceived.  It leads us to 
necessarily rename the ovals to differentiate between those of Red and those of Blue.  For 
example, Oval 2-Red is not the same as Oval 2-Blue because the opposing forces are 
using different sensors at different locations in the battlespace.  Now, there are those 
“sensors” that are common to both Red and Blue.  We all have nearly equal access to 
open sources such as CNN, Al-Jazeera and Debka or perhaps TerraServer.  The 
information available via those sources would “overlap” in the second Ovals.  This 
implies a kind of Venn diagram in which the Ovals of Red, Blue and neutral forces have 
areas that intersect and areas that are unique.  In this model, we are most interested in 
those unique areas, but we should not discount the ability to introduce information and 
misinformation deliberately via those other vehicles.  Based on that consideration, the 
current incarnation of the model will keep Oval 2-Red and Oval 2-Blue as separate and 
distinct from each other.  Additionally, it implies we know something of Red’s lenses of 
perception so they can be represented accurately in the model.  This assumption may not 
always be valid.  Valid or not, we do know they exist and have an impact on his higher-
order ovals of awareness.  That is, the same kind of lens distortions of Figure 2 applies 
equally to Red force decision makers. 
 
Additionally, Red force decisions are implemented through the feedback control he exerts 
on his own forces, sensors and networks.  The Red force control would appear like the 
control lines of Figure 3.  A decision maker’s actions include providing direction to his 
own physical forces and management of his own sensor and network resources.  Of 
course, other feedback includes adjustments to his OPORD and local doctrine.  He also 
seeks to reduce distortions of his lenses and make his own forces more effective. 
 
If Red forces work as teams, the model can accommodate that functionality as well as 
shown in Figure 5.  This particular diagram shows a team interaction in which Ovals 1 
and 2 are the same for several different teams (shared), but Ovals 3 through 6 differ 
among individual members of the same team.  The point of divergence in such a teaming 
environment may be at Oval 2 (if sensor output is not shared) or at Oval 4 (if all 
participants have equal access to the shared C2 network).   This can be particularly useful 
when considering the participation of coalition partners and mapping their decision 
making processes based on shared information.  There are pros and cons to designing to 
share at Oval 3 or at Oval 2.  Further, if Red forces are composed of a similar coalition 
(or a more loosely aggregated band of competing war-lords), one would want to know at 
what level they share information so that can be explicitly modeled as well. 
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Figure 5: Red and Blue teams 
 
Implications of including Red forces 
 
If we have specifically included the comprehension and perception of the Red forces, the 
next logical step is to include offensive information operations (IO) against him.  In the 
broadest sense, IO includes actions taken across the spectrum of adversarial relationships, 
from competition to full-scale conflict.  According to Joint Publication 3-13, IO is 
defined as the “integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 
computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 
operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 
while protecting our own” [Joint Pub 3-13].  This is of some importance, because the 
focus is now not only on the information systems, but on the decision-makers [Allen].  IO 
can involve covert action against a competitor’s political, economic and physical 
infrastructure.  Thus, it can allow national objectives to be achieved across the spectrum 
of conflict [Schleher].  However, the current work focuses only on command and control 
warfare.  That is, the operations against military decision makers and their command and 
control systems. 
 
The goal of C2 warfare is to reduce the enemy’s ability to gather and manage information 
on the battlespace and make decisions based on that information that will influence the 
outcome of the total conflict.  This is a worthy goal in modern warfare.  One might even 
argue it should be the only goal.  It is not Red’s actual means to resist Blue’s objectives 
that is the target of action in the information age.  Rather, the true and correct target is 
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Red’s perception of his means to resist.  His decisions are based on his perception of the 
situation, his alternative courses of actions and his projection of those alternatives 
[Waltz].  If Red’s perception that all his viable options will lead to results counter to his 
own goals, he will have little choice but to behave in a way consistent with Blue’s 
desires.  
 
However, Red, like Blue, is seeking to gain a position of information superiority and then 
leverage that position to create and maintain his own competitive advantage [Alberts, 
Garstka & Stein, 1999].  Our goal is to reduce the quality of his battlespace information.  
If we define the quality of that information in terms of its timeliness, relevance and 
accuracy; any action taken by Blue forces to reduce one or more of those attributes is 
considered C2 warfare.  In the same way that arrows were added to the original model to 
represent feedback control of one’s own forces and management of sensors and networks, 
we have added arrows to represent offensive C2W as shown in Figure 6.  The arrows do 
not represent specific means to affect the flow of information, but the influence of the 
action on the content of the affected ovals. 


















Figure 6: Offensive C2 Warfare 
Counter-sensor warfare is aimed primarily at degrading the quality and quantity of 
information at Oval 2.  It includes classic electronic warfare such as jamming intended to 
deny the proper operation of sensors and deception intended to introduce false signatures.  
Traditional signature reduction minimizes a physical asset’s observability.  That is, those 
physical signatures generated by items in Oval 1 are reduced in quantity and magnitude, 
reducing the likelihood they will be detected by sensors.  Thus, they will not be 
represented in Oval 2.  The use of expendable decoys and even physical destruction of an 
enemy’s sensor assets should be considered.  The common element here is an attempt at 
reducing the quality of data detected by technological systems.  As such, one would 
expect actions to be technologically-centered vice human-centered.  Similarly, electronic 
warfare aimed at disrupting communication links and networks degrades the quantity and 
quality of information available at Oval 3.  That is, the information gathered by the 
sensors (Oval 2) is made available to human operators, and Blue forces want to impact 
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designer of a complete information campaign to consider the potential interaction 
between the two.  However, one should not try to separate IO planning elements from the 
overall operational plan.  Ultimately, the best option mix of kinetic and non-kinetic 
aspects forms the optimal course of action [Allen].  If Blue introduces false signals and 
decoys, he would want that to propagate to Oval 3 while not allowing the propagation of 
information in Oval 2 that might reduce the effectiveness of such deception. 
 
We should also revisit the concept of feedback loops.  These loops represent the result of 
a commander’s decision-making process, with regard to directing physical forces, 
management of sensor and network resources, and adjustments to OPORD and local 
doctrine.  Forcing mismanagement of sensors or networks may have as great an effect as 
an attack on the network or sensor itself.  This kind of disruption can now be added to the 



















Figure 7: Disruption of Feedback 
A more complete consideration of counter-communication warfare requires us to 
examine the influence of geographically-dispersed players in the C2 process.  If we 
consider our opposition’s use of teams, we must focus attention on those links that enable 
sharing of perception, comprehension and prediction between entities A, B, and C.  
Information operations can now be more specifically aimed at anti-communication.  The 
ties between entities are severed and kept disconnected as shown in Figure 8. 
 
While the same anti-network warfare mentioned previously could negatively impact any 
network infrastructure, the goal here is specifically to reduce Red forces’ capability to 
share knowledge and collaborate which will prevent any effective self-synchronization.  
Injecting false or deceptive information into the information net (at Oval 3) would have a 
similar effect.  An attacker could choose between jamming the information recovery 
circuit or the synchronization circuitry.  Causing a loss of synchronization may be more 
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Either way, affecting even a relatively low bit error rate will virtually deny the use of a 
typical tactical data link [Schleher].  One could even now consider introducing different 
deceptive information – one picture tailored for entity A, another for entity B, etc.  If a 
truly networked force relies on those connections and resulting self-synchronization, the 
results could be anything from delays in spares and supplies delivery to lethal Red-on-
Red engagements.  Indeed, as all organizations are vulnerable to failures induced by 
internal power struggles, one could introduce information enhancing the negative effects 




















Figure 8: Anti-communications efforts 
And, of course, we include operations aimed at Red force lenses of doctrine and 
OPORDS to introduce distortions in perception and comprehension.  The entire spectrum 
of deception, psychological operations, and all means to impact human-centered aspects 
of cognition can be mapped into this model extension. 
 
The next logical step may overstep the traditional behavior intended by the original 
model.  However, it is included here as a means to further visualize the potential uses of 
including Red forces.  Given that humans have been added to the model as providing 
direct verbal (or similar) reports to a decision maker, it seems appropriate to explicitly 
indicate how Blue forces can influence Red force behavior through that venue.  Figure 9 




One of the original model extensions explicitly included human actors interacting with a 
decision-maker by providing input at Lens A [Miller & Shattuck, 2006].  That input is 
from those actors’ Ovals 4, 5, and 6 – representing their own perception, comprehension 
or projection.  That is depicted by the “voice bubbles” of the stick-figures in the model.  
It is first filtered through Lens A along with the rest of the perceived information at Oval 
3.  A Blue actor could be covertly inserted with the others and his misinformation could 
potentially have an influence on the decision-maker with equal weight as Red’s own team 
members.  That is, Ovals 5 and 6 would be corrupted.  It should be noted that this 
extension appears to be least helpful in current experimentation and modeling efforts.  
However, its usefulness may become more apparent in time.  One should also keep in 
mind that this interaction does not necessarily require physical contact between the 





As the original model has been used to model the flow of information in military 
decision-making processes, this extension will be used to model how degradations in 
information quality or quantity affect those same decisions.  In this case, one would be 
most interested in quantifying the impact of degradation in information and information 
sharing on the overall force effectiveness.  The dynamic interaction among all battlespace 
actors (friendly, adversary and neutral) is a key element in analyzing C2 effectiveness 
[NATO COBP].  It is clear from the original model that information goes missing or is 
corrupted as it “transfers” between ovals as a result of limitations in sensors, networks or 
the commander’s “lenses.”  Naturally, those limitations could be exploited by an enemy.  
Inclusion of Red forces means his actions against Blue forces can be considered.  The 
scope of the model should remain focused on the sensor-to-decider chain.  That means 
we are only including Red and Blue force C2 warfare.  All sensors and communications 
systems are legitimate targets for physical destruction, temporary disruption or deception.  
It allows us to more effectively identify our own systems’ weaknesses and propose 
defensive C2W solutions.  Indeed, the United States Joint Forces Command considers 
severe degradation or loss of information networking as the highest risk to effective C2 
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Figure 9: Blue and Red direct human interaction 
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maintained here.  Additionally, as with the original, any size force operating at any level 
of warfare or operations can be modeled.  That makes the inclusion of adversary forces 
particularly useful whether considering operations against a near-peer competitor in 
traditional conflict or non-state entities in an asymmetric scenario. 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of C2W is as challenging as measuring the effectiveness of 
any C2 system itself.  Ultimately, the end-users are concerned with high-level measures 
of force effectiveness or even measures of policy effectiveness.  The latter set of 
measures is most applicable in operations other than war (OOTW).  That is, actions that 
could be highly effective in “winning a war” may be counterproductive in a mission such 
as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance or in civil reconstruction.  It becomes a 
question not so much of physical effects, but how actions are perceived by actors in a 
region [NATO COBP, 2002].  We then propose to begin with the measures of C2 
effectiveness as supporting the higher level measures of force or policy effectiveness, 
which have been discussed in several sources [Bornman, McCafferty and Lea, C2 JIC].  
The effectiveness of our C2W against Red forces is then tied directly to the 
ineffectiveness of his C2 systems.  That is, we are interested in our ability to counter 
Red’s ability to develop and maintain shared situational awareness and understanding.  
One would examine how well he can present tailored, relevant, synthesized, actionable 
information to promote understanding [C2 JIC].  That metric could be composed (in part) 
of an objective measure of Red’s information’s lack of timeliness, relevance, accuracy 
and accessibility following Blue’s initiation of some C2W action.  Another measure 
might be the percent reduction in Red’s decision capacity and accuracy or the delay 
introduced until decision [Waltz].  For kinetic effectors, documents like the Joint 
Munitions Effectiveness Manual provide expected damage caused by a given type of 
weapon against a given type of target.  However, there is no similar document for 
planning factors associated with nonkinetic effectors [Allen].  This tool could help that 
process of identifying Information Age planning factors. 
 
The proposed extension implies that only top-down, commander-directed C2W actions 
are allowed.  That is not the intent.  As all actors in a battlespace can act in self-
synchronizing ways, the application of C2W should be viewed in a similar context.  That 
is, actors with electronic and information-oriented effectors can apply them based on a 
shared understanding of the commander’s intent and shared battlespace awareness with 
their peers.  Even in a classic, non-network-centric system, the sensor-decider-shooter 
chain should be shortened by allowing those individual engagement systems with 
autonomous search capability to engage enemy elements in time-critical situations 
[MacFadzean].  In the information age, that engagement can be varied in its incarnation, 
but with its essence always focused at influencing an adversary’s perceptions and 
projections.  Indeed, this model is intended to capture the C2W interaction at any level of 
warfare at any level in a decision-making organization.  That is, Ovals 5 and 6 “belong” 
to anyone with the capability to direct offensive C2W, from a single air-defense battery 
to a combined force commander. 
 
Care must be taken to consider the effects of those operations at the right level, too.  A 
tactical-level application of counter-sensor or counter-communication action could very 
well have a strategic-level impact.  This implies that the C2W rules of engagement and 
that at least a theater-level C2 campaign plan be a part of the commander’s intent.  
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Information weapons and C2 weapons should be applied not with complete anarchy, but 
with the precision required of any physical weapon.  One must prepare for and manage 
C2W actions, from target nomination through weaponeering and finally attack with battle 
damage assessment [Waltz].  Particularly with deception planning, the careful application 
of multiple actions should limit the target’s ability to access and compare multiple 
sources so that the possibility of detecting the presence of deception is minimized [Kott].  





The proposed extensions of the Dynamic Model for Situated Cognition are an attempt to 
increase the robustness, flexibility and breadth of applicability of the original.  Event 
analysis and predictive modeling efforts of network-centric forces opposing each other in 
the battlespace can be aided by this tool.  The extension shares all the advantages of the 
original: 
• Realistic information flow is represented in the operational environment, 
including its collection and dissemination, and eventual use.  Lost information, 
mistakes in judgment and the impact of the human element is clear. 
• Commander’s decisions are represented explicitly, and are based on his 
perception of the battlespace. 
• It is flexible enough to be applied across the spectrum of military missions and 
tasks. 
• It is adaptable enough to be used at any level of warfare and for any size 
organization. 
 
Additionally, it brings more advantages with it: 
• Opposing commanders’ perception is explicitly represented, which allows the 
effects of information operations to be considered.  The “ripple effect” of 
processing degraded information from lower order to higher ovals is clear: 
inaccuracies in the commander’s perception and projection. 
• C2 systems are represented as entities in the operational environment.  They can 
be targeted just like any other entity.  Their ultimate utility is in their ability to 
enable decision-makers to take action. 
• Information operations for opposing forces are explicitly included.  Deliberate 
attack and protection of C2 systems allows us to model degradation in the quality 
of the adversary’s information and how that impacts his decision-making process. 
• The focus is on what the attacker intends to accomplish with his actions against an 
adversary’s C2 systems rather than on how those actions will be accomplished.  
Form should follow function.  The objectives of C2W should be established 
before considering an adversary’s vulnerabilities and corresponding points to 
apply deception or denial, consistent with any other effects-based operations 
planning and execution. 
The extension is now more consistent with C2 modeling guidelines provided by NATO 
[NATO COBP, 2002].  Information operations and C2 warfare are not new, but including 




However, this is just the initial proposal for these extensions.  Their ultimate utility can 
only be proved through the various venues already taking advantage of the original, 
including laboratory and field-based experimentation.  The goal is to provide system 
designers and campaign planners with an aid in their efforts to realize the full potential of 
network centric warfare and the precision control of perception. 
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